Low Findings


Magic number in MAX_BOND_UNBOND_AT constant

Severity: Low

Ecosystem: Sui

Protocol: Momentum

Auditor: Sherlock

Report: https://1760493472-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-x-prod.appspot.com/o/spaces%2FvMYfd5Y4I2ZxHbqdOD88%2Fuploads%2FCoI611HTaCx34uzF6O8j%2F2025_11_12_Final_Momentum_Collaborative_Audit_Report_1762918494.pdf?alt=media&token=216a66b1-491d-405a-a57f-b1b9f530ab78

Report Date: Nov 2025

Description:

The MAX_BOND_UNBOND_AT is set to 0xffff_ffff_ffff_ffff (u64 max) but this magic number isn't documented. Future developers might not understand its significance.


Excessive Validation Limits in GlobalConfig

Severity: Low

Ecosystem: Sui

Protocol: Momentum CLMM

Auditor: Asymptotic

Report: https://1760493472-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-x-prod.appspot.com/o/spaces%2FvMYfd5Y4I2ZxHbqdOD88%2Fuploads%2FVUTBtknlPDNNKXFHp9zw%2FAsymptotic Audit of Momentum CLMM.pdf?alt=media&token=e58fb859-d4be-4b65-ac1d-92df0790b6cf

Report Date: Aug 2025

Description:

The global config module contains unreasonably high validation limits in the enable fee rate function: • fee rate limit allows up to 99.9999%, which is excessive and could enable abusive fee settings. • tick spacing limit allows up to 4,194,304, far beyond practical needs and could impact pool efficiency and gas costs. Additionally, the initial configuration and validation limits are hardcoded. Using literals directly in code instead of named constants makes maintenance harder and increases the risk of errors or inconsistencies.


Ambiguous Boundary Definition for active_id

Severity: Low

Ecosystem: Sui

Protocol: Cetus DLMM

Auditor: MoveBit

Report: https://drive.google.com/drive/u/0/folders/1d9nv3nJidsbQ0vDT8D1kEuR3rJzK2ULg

Report Date: Sep 2025

Description:

The active_id boundary check in create_pool_internal lacks clear design specification. Uses strict inequalities (gt/lt) excluding boundary values ±443636, but design intent is unclear - should boundaries be valid or invalid?


Minimum CToken Bounds

Severity: Low

Ecosystem: Sui

Protocol: Suilend

Auditor: OtterSec

Report: 

https://ottersec.notion.site/Sampled-Public-Audit-Reports-a296e98838aa4fdb8f3b192663400772

Report Date: Apr 2024

Description: The MIN_AVAILABLE_AMOUNT constant in reserve acts as a threshold to thwart specific rounding bug attacks by ensuring that a minimum amount of the underlying token may not be withdrawn or borrowed. However, this constant should also cover ctoken_supply, which is used to critically reinitialize the ctoken ratio.


Unused Module

Severity: Low

Ecosystem: Sui

Protocol: Cetus Concentrated Liquidity Protocol (Sui)

Auditor: MoveBit

Report: https://github.com/movebit/Sampled-Audit-Reports/blob/main/reports/Cetus-Concentrated-Liquidity-Protocol-Sui-Contract-Audit-Report.pdf

Report Date: Apr 2023

Description:

dl_list_table module is not used.


Unused Return Value

Severity: Low

Ecosystem: Sui

Protocol: Cetus Concentrated Liquidity Protocol (Sui)

Auditor: MoveBit

Report: https://github.com/movebit/Sampled-Audit-Reports/blob/main/reports/Cetus-Concentrated-Liquidity-Protocol-Sui-Contract-Audit-Report.pdf

Report Date: Apr 2023

Description:

The function position::increase_liquidity has a return value of type u128, but it is not used.


Unused Function

Severity: Low

Ecosystem: Sui

Protocol: Cetus Concentrated Liquidity Protocol (Sui)

Auditor: MoveBit

Report: https://github.com/movebit/Sampled-Audit-Reports/blob/main/reports/Cetus-Concentrated-Liquidity-Protocol-Sui-Contract-Audit-Report.pdf

Report Date: Apr 2023

Description:

The method borrow_mut_tick_for_swap exists but is not used anywhere in the entire contract. It is also public, which poses a security risk.


Irregularity in Fee Comment Annotation

Severity: Low

Ecosystem: Aptos

Protocol: Echleon

Auditor: OtterSec

Report: https://ottersec.notion.site/Sampled-Public-Audit-Reports-a296e98838aa4fdb8f3b192663400772

Report Date: Apr 2025

Description:

DEFAULT_ORIGINATION_FEE_BPS value (10) is mislabeled as 0.01% in the comment, though it actually represents 0.10%.


Inaccurate MAX_MSAFE_OWNERS_LIMIT

Severity: Low

Ecosystem: Aptos

Protocol: MSafe MVP Program

Auditor: OtterSec

Report: https://ottersec.notion.site/Sampled-Public-Audit-Reports-a296e98838aa4fdb8f3b192663400772

Report Date: Oct 2023

Description:

An additional nonce key is added in derive_multisig_auth_key. This means that the actual MAX_MSAFE_OWNERS_LIMIT should be one less than the Aptos enforced maximum of 32, or a total of 31.


Unused Constants Should Be Removed

Severity: Low

Ecosystem: Aptos

Protocol: StreamFlow

Auditor: MoveBit

Report: https://movebit.xyz/reports/StreamFlow2-Final-Audit-Report.pdf

Report Date: Mar 2024

Description:

There are unused constants that may be removed.


verify_platform Uses A Magic Number

Severity: Low

Ecosystem: Aptos

Protocol: Superposition

Auditor: MoveBit

Report: https://movebit.xyz/reports/Superposition-Final-Audit-Report.pdf

Report Date: Mar 2024

Description:

In the verify_platform function, it checks that if the p.body.platform == 1 which means that if it's on Aptos. However, using a magic number is confusing and not easy to modify in the future.